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ABSTRACT 
 
This study in the Korean context investigates the effect of book-tax conformity on the use of 
accruals. In a sample of 4,331 Korean firms, we divide total accruals into book-tax accruals and 
book-only accruals. Book-tax accruals are defined as those that affect both taxable income and 
reported earnings. Book-only accruals are defined as those that affect only reported earnings and 
are unrelated to taxable income. We anticipate that managers will decrease taxable income by 
recording book-tax accruals that conform relatively closely to taxable income in order to reduce 
their tax liability. They are expected to attempt to increase book income through book-only 
accruals. We also examine the market response to firms that use these two types of accruals in 
different ways. Our evidence demonstrates increased use of income-decreasing book-tax accruals 
to decrease taxable income and increased use of book-only accruals to increase financial income. 
Use of book-only accruals also compensates for potential costs unrelated to tax, such as financial 
reporting costs. In addition, our results show that the market correctly assesses the management of 
accruals even when the uses of book-tax and book-only accruals offset each other. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his study in the Korean context investigates the effect of book-tax conformity on the use of accruals. 
In a sample of 4,331 Korean firms, we divide total accruals into book-tax accruals and book-only 
accruals. In this study, book-tax accruals are defined as those that affect both taxable income and 
reported earnings. Book-only accruals are defined as those that affect only reported earnings and are unrelated to 
taxable income (Calegari, 2000). 
 
When accounting numbers are used for tax calculation, the incentive for tax avoidance and earnings 
management may increase (Monem, 2003). In Korea, taxable income is calculated through tax adjustments based on 
book income. Because Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) allows more discretion than tax 
regulations, managers prefer to use accounting strategies to modify their reporting of taxable income rather than 
adjusting taxable income directly. In many cases, taxable income and book income are sufficiently similar that some 
revenues and expenses may be recognized within the same period for both tax and financial reporting purposes 
(Calegari, 2000). In this situation, managers may choose book-tax accruals to reduce book income and minimize tax 
payments (Guenther, 1994; Guenther et al., 1997; Northcut & Vines, 1998). On the other hand, book income may be 
increased without affecting taxable income by reducing the allowance for bad debts, for example. Because tax codes 
forbid certain allowances, book-only accruals can be used to increase book income to avoid increasing taxable 
income in Korea. 
 
Calegari (2000) argues that lowering book-tax accruals reduces net income as reported in the financial 
statement, which can affect accounting-based contracts and reduce firm value. To offset these potential costs, book-
only accrual policies may be altered so as to accelerate the reporting of income-increasing accruals. For example, 
reserve policies can be adjusted without incurring additional tax costs in Korea. 
 
In an efficient market, participants may correctly impound the value of current earnings components into 
stock prices. Prior studies suggest that measuring discretionary accruals can be used as a proxy to detect earnings 
T 
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management. When firms manage accruals in different ways, the discretionary accruals method can’t detect earnings 
management because the use of one type of accrual is offset by the use of another type. In these circumstances, the 
absolute value of earnings management may be large, and earnings quality may therefore be lower. If the market is 
efficient, stock prices fully reflect the contribution of all earnings components. Therefore, market participants are 
likely to show negative responses to firms using accruals in two different ways. Investors may also misunderstand 
this management of accruals because the total amount of accruals will seem small. However, use of the discretionary 
accruals method may moderate this negative response if discretionary accruals are not separated into book-tax 
accruals and book-only accruals. 
 
In the context of our sample of Korean firms, we anticipate that managers will decrease taxable income by 
recording book-tax accruals that conform relatively well to taxable income in order to reduce their tax liability. We 
postulate that they will attempt to increase book income through book-only accruals. In addition, we investigate the 
market response to management of accrual components for tax and financial reporting purposes. Our evidence 
demonstrates that managers of Korean firms use income-decreasing book-tax accruals to decrease taxable income 
increasingly more often. They also use book-only accruals to increase financial income and compensate potential 
non-tax costs, such as financial reporting costs. In addition, our results show that the market correctly assesses the 
management of accruals even when they are used in different ways. 
 
This study contributes to the stream of research on book-tax conformity. We investigate the management of 
accrual components in light of book and tax incentives in Korean firms with high book-tax conformity. In addition 
to examining the use of accrual components by Korean firms, we investigate the market’s ability to interpret the 
management of accrual components correctly. 
 
The next section outlines the findings of previous research in this area and develops the research 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes sample selection procedures and the methodology used to test the hypotheses. 
Section 4 presents some descriptive statistics and the results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
If managers report high accounting income to increase the value of the company, corporate tax will increase. 
However, reporting low accounting income to reduce corporate tax may put the company in an unfavorable position 
in the capital market and decrease corporate value. Thus, accruals management in the reported earnings of the 
company for the purpose of tax reduction increases non-tax costs. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) state that 
corporations with high marginal tax rates have an incentive to use discretionary accounting methods to adjust 
taxable income. However, lower accounting income may result in a negative evaluation by the capital market, which 
is a form of non-tax cost. If managers use book-only accruals at this time, accounting income may be increased, but 
taxable income will remain constant, thereby lowering non-tax costs.
1
 
 
Calegari (2000) considers book income disclosure and avoidance of tax expenses together. He separates 
discretionary accruals into book-tax accruals and book-only accruals based on the level of book-tax conformity, 
arguing that firms with increased marginal tax rates use book-tax accruals to achieve tax planning goals. Managers 
use book-only accruals to avoid non-tax costs such as financial reporting costs. In his study, book-tax accruals refer 
to accruals with higher tax conformity in circumstances where the tax code allows similar or equal treatment when 
computing the corporation’s taxable income. Thus, book-tax accruals affect both taxable income and reported 
earnings. On the other hand, book-only accruals are associated with relatively low tax conformity. They affect 
reported earnings and have no effect on the corporation’s taxable income (Calegari 2000). However, this approach 
hasn’t been developed because of low book tax conformity in US. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Examples of non-tax costs include increased financial reporting costs in the capital market when tax burdens are reduced, or tax authorities’ 
monitoring of tax avoidance (Mills & Sansing, 2000). In what follows, only explicit tax burdens are viewed as tax costs; they are differentiated 
from non-tax costs. 
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Book-tax conformity is more prevalent in Korea than in some other parts of the world, such as the US. In 
this environment, accruals may be easily divided into book-tax accruals and book-only accruals, and the 
management of these two types of accruals may be easily investigated. Choi et al. (2009) argue that the higher book-
tax conformity in Korea than the US is mostly due to differences in treatment of unrealized gains or losses and in 
allowances, and the discrepancy between GAAP and tax rules. Because American firms report more unrealized 
gains and losses, book-tax conformity in the US is much lower than that in Korea. Furthermore, Korean tax rules 
prohibit faster tax depreciation deductions than book depreciation expenses, and allowances for bad debts are fully 
tax deductible in Korea as long as they are within the limit specified by the tax law. Accordingly, these differences 
result in higher book-tax conformity in Korea. 
 
Managers want to increase disclosed book income and reduce taxes, which are unilaterally paid with no 
benefit in return. Previous studies have examined incentives for book income disclosure and avoidance of tax 
expenses in light of earnings management. However, these incentives must be considered for both outcomes together. 
In this study, earnings management is examined with simultaneous consideration of these two incentives. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 
Mills and Plesko (2003) state that the average ratio of book income to taxable income in the US ranges 
from 1.4 to 1.7. In Korea, this ratio is in the range of 0.9 to 1.1. In Korea, where book-tax conformity is higher than 
in other countries, taxable income is calculated through tax adjustments that begin with book income. In this process, 
which is based on accrual accounting, accruals are not recognized by Korean tax rules. Most accruals generated by 
accounting reactions to economic events are reflected in tax reporting as well. Managers can reduce taxable income 
by deferring recognition of revenues until later and accruing expenses earlier. 
 
However, accounting treatments related to estimations such as excessive depreciation, various allowances 
for valuation, and appropriation liabilities are not reflected in tax reporting based on the settlement principle of 
claims and obligations. Managers may attempt to increase book income by reducing allowances for bad debts and 
depreciating fixed assets beyond tax limits. Therefore, book income may be increased with no additional tax burden. 
 
Accruals used for reducing taxable income may be called book-tax accruals, and accruals that do not affect 
taxable income may be reported through tax adjustment. The latter can be called book-only accruals, as they affect 
reported earnings only. Calegari (2000) suggest that firms adjust discretionary accruals with relatively high tax 
conformity (book-tax accruals) to achieve tax-planning goals and use discretionary accruals with relatively low tax 
conformity (book-only accruals) to accomplish financial reporting objectives. 
 
The best strategy for managers is to report a high accounting income and a low taxable income. To 
accomplish these goals, managers may utilize these two types of accruals, book-tax accruals, and book-only accruals, 
differently. They tend to use book-tax accruals to reduce taxes and book-only accruals to increase reported earnings. 
 
Tax savings are generally maximized by deferring revenues and accelerating expenses. Thus, tax 
conformity may impose significant non-tax costs on firms. Tax conformity may make firms appear to be relatively 
worse off to external parties (i.e., actual and potential investors, lenders, and suppliers) than they would be without 
conformity. Tax conformity may also increase the probability of firm violation of debt covenants or reduce managers’ 
compensation associated with book income (Cloyd et al., 1996). 
 
Seo and Yoon (2011) suggest that firms cannot maximize tax savings and financial reporting income 
independently without some cost. Based on the findings of their research, we examine the association between the 
use of book-tax accruals and that of book-only accruals. Because management of book-tax accruals reduces both 
taxable income and financial statement income, we argue that firms will simultaneously increase financial statement 
income by recording income-increasing accruals that have relatively low book-tax conformity to avoid non-tax costs. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The use of book-tax accruals will be offset by the use of book-only accruals. 
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The earnings response coefficient is influenced by the quality of profits. The higher the quality of profits, 
the more responsive investors will be to the reported profits. Holthousen and Verrecchia (1988) defined the quality 
of accounting income as the variance of the errors contained in the information. They reported that the smaller the 
variance of the errors contained in the accounting income, the higher the quality of the accounting income. If book-
tax accruals are used to reduce taxable income, and book-only accruals are used to increase book income, the 
amount of earnings management measured by discretionary accruals will be small because the first type of accrual is 
offset by the second type. Therefore, earnings management may appear to be minimal. 
 
However, if book-tax accruals are used to reduce taxable income, the quality of accounting information will 
decline. In addition, if book-only accruals are used to increase reported earnings, earnings quality will decline. 
Accordingly, for firms that increase book-only accruals while decreasing book-tax accruals, the earnings response 
coefficient will be low. In strong-form efficiency markets, investors will react negatively even if the management of 
book-tax accruals is offset by the management of book-only accruals and the total variation in accruals is minimal. 
Hence, Hypothesis 2 is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In an efficient market, market participants will respond negatively to the management of accruals, 
even those used in different ways. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Designing Research Model 
 
3.1.1 Measuring Book-Tax Accruals and Book-Only Accruals 
 
In order to measure book-tax accruals and book-only accruals, the procedure of Calegari (2000) is adopted 
in this study. Discretionary accruals are estimated as the difference between total accruals and estimated non-
discretionary accruals. Accruals derived from operating activities represent the ordinary performance of the firm; 
decision-makers are more interested in ordinary accruals than in extraordinary accruals (Bradshaw et al., 2001). 
Therefore, in this study, we focus on accruals from operating activities. Consistent with previous studies of earnings 
management (Jones, 1991; Bradshaw et al., 2001), total accruals (TA) for firm i in year t are computed as follows: 
 
                                          
 
where ΔCA is the change in current assets for firm i between years t – 1 and t. Similarly, ΔSTDEBT is the change in 
the current portion of long-term debt, ΔCL is the change in current liability, ΔCASH is the change in the cash and 
cash equivalent balances, and DEP represents depreciation and amortization expenses. All variables are deflated by 
total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 
Total accruals (TA) are divided into total book-tax accruals and total book-only accruals. To estimate total 
book-tax accruals, certain accrual items lacking high tax conformity are removed: 
 
                 
 
                                                           
 
where ΔTAXPAY is the change in income taxes payable for firm i between years t – 1 and t. Likewise, ΔTAXREC is 
the change in income taxes receivable. ΔTAXPAY and ΔTAXREC are eliminated because these variables represent 
income taxes due or receivable from the government and therefore are not part of the corporation’s taxable income. 
ΔDTL is removed from total accruals because it includes deferred income taxes. Allowance for bad debts, other 
allowances, and depreciation expenses are classified as book-only accruals.
2
 
 
                                                          
2 As accounting choices with inherent estimations like various allowances for losses on valuation, appropriation liabilities, and bad debt expenses 
are not recognized by the tax law, they were classified as book-only accruals. 
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Based on this classification of book-tax accruals and book-only accruals, the following regression equation 
was used to estimate discretionary book-tax accruals (DBTA) (hereafter, “book-tax accruals”) and discretionary 
book-only accruals (DBOA) (hereafter, “book-only accruals”) (Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Sunramanyam, 1996): 
 
                
 
         
   
              
         
   
      
         
  
 
                
 
         
   
              
         
   
     
         
   
      
         
  
 
        = Total assets 
        = Changes in sales 
     = Changes in account receivables 
      = Tangible and intangible assets - (land + construction in progress) 
      = Cash flow from operating activities 
 
3.1.2 Research Model 
 
Equation (1) is the test model for Hypotheses 1. The dependent variable for testing of the first hypothesis is 
discretionary book-only accruals (DBOA). The coefficient of interest is β1, the coefficient of discretionary book-tax 
accruals (DBTA). If the sign of β1 in Equation (1) is negative, the result can be interpreted to coincide with the 
hypothesis of this study. 
 
                                                        (1) 
 
       = Discretionary book-tax accruals 
       = Discretionary book-only accruals 
       = Natural logarithm of total assets 
      = Debt ratio (total liabilities/total assets) 
      = Cash flow from operations (operating cash flow/total assets) 
      = Price-to-book value ratio (stock price /book value per share) 
 
Company size (SIZE) is included as a control variable. As the size of the company grows, the financial 
reporting costs will increase to the point that the company may increase earnings (Badertscher et al., 2009). If 
political costs are substituted, the incentive for reporting higher earnings may be suppressed (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986). As the debt ratio (LEV) increases, earnings management behavior also increases, according to some studies 
(Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994). According to other research (DeAngelo et al., 1994), as the debt ratio increases, the 
company shows increased negative accruals. To control for the possibility that the debt ratio may affect discretionary 
accruals, this study includes the debt ratio (LEV), obtained by dividing total liabilities by total assets, as a control 
variable. Following previous studies (Dechow et al., 1995; DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998) in which a negative 
relationship was established between cash flow and discretionary accruals, a cash flow variable (CFO), obtained by 
dividing the cash flow from operating activities by the initial total assets, is included in the regression equation. In 
addition, to control for the influence of the growth of the company on accruals, the price book value ratio (PBR) is 
included in the model. 
 
The purpose of Hypothesis 2 is to test the ability of investors to recognize accrual components correctly 
even when they are used in two different ways. For this purpose, the earnings response coefficient is used. In 
financial economics, the earnings response coefficient, or ERC, is the estimated relationship between equity returns 
and the unexpected portion of (i.e., new information in) companies' earnings announcements. 
 
In an efficient market, equity prices are generally expected to reflect all relevant information at a given time. 
Market participants with superior information are expected to exploit that information until share prices have 
effectively impounded it. Therefore, some changes in a company's share price are expected to result from changes in 
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the relevant information available to the market. The ERC is an estimate of the change in a company's stock price 
due to the information provided in a company's earnings announcement. 
 
Accordingly, unexpected earnings, the dummy variable (EC) indicating firms with negative discretionary 
book-tax accruals and positive discretionary book-only accruals reported at the same time, their interaction variable, 
and the control variables are included in the following regression model: 
 
                                                                      (2) 
 
      = Cumulative abnormal returns 
     = 1 for a company with negative DBTA and positive DBOA at the same time; otherwise 0 
     = Unexpected earnings, {(net income − net income of the previous period)/ market value at the beginning 
of the year} 
       = Natural logarithm of total assets 
      = Debt ratio (total liabilities/total assets) 
      = Cash flow from operations (operating cash flow/total assets) 
      = Price-to-book value ratio (stock price /book value per share) 
 
In Equation (2), the dependent variable, cumulative abnormal return (CAR), is based on the cumulative 
sum of the monthly abnormal return from April to March of the following year calculated using the market 
adjustment model. Here, the abnormal return is obtained by subtracting the monthly market return, calculated using 
the value-weighted market index (VWI) from the monthly stock return. The independent variable, unexpected 
earnings (UE), was obtained by subtracting the actual net income of the previous year from the actual net income of 
the current year and dividing it by the initial total market value. Here, β3, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between EC and UE, is the main regression coefficient for Hypothesis 2. In other words, if β3 has a statistically 
significant negative value, this indicates that market participants interpret earnings management correctly, although 
the two types of accruals have been used in different ways. If they have not interpreted correctly, however, the 
resulting value will be statistically insignificant. 
 
As for control variables, the natural log of the initial total assets was included in the model to control for 
company size. As the size of the company increases, the number of stakeholders increases. Therefore, the 
informativeness of earnings will decrease, and a negative relationship with CAR is expected. According to Dahliwal 
et al. (1991), who found lower earnings response coefficients for companies with high debt ratios than for 
companies with no or very few liabilities, the value obtained by dividing total liabilities by total assets may be 
included to control for the effect of debt ratio. Lastly, the value obtained by dividing the total market value by total 
stockholder equity is included in the model as a control variable to control for the growth potential of the company 
(PBR). As improved profitability is likely in companies with high growth potential, investors’ responsiveness will 
also increase. Therefore, for companies with high growth potential and a high earnings response coefficient, a 
positive relationship between CAR and PBR is expected (Collins & Kothari, 1989). 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
The sample for this research includes firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange as of December 31, 2011. 
The following conditions were applied in the sample selection process: 
 
1. Companies listed on the KOSPI market during the period 2001–2010, based on 2011 data. 
2. Firms with December year-end, excluding firms from the financial industry. 
3. Firms for which financial and stock values can be extracted from KIS-Value (http://www.kisline.com). 
 
Winsorization of the upper and lower 1% of the sample was performed based on dependent and 
independent variables. Details of the sample selection process are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2014 Volume 30, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 759 The Clute Institute 
Table 1: Sample Descriptions 
Sample Selection Procedure Firm-Years 
All firm-year observations from Korea Stock Exchange during the period 2001~2010 7,056 
(Less) Financial service (522) 
(Less) Non-December firms (675) 
(Less) Firms in industry with < 10 firms (99) 
(Less) Firms with insufficient financial data (1,125) 
(Less) Firms with insufficient stock value (304) 
Final sample size used for hypotheses 4,331 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used to test the hypotheses. Mean and median values 
of DBTA are −0.004 and 0.001, respectively. This result indicates that the listed firms have a tendency to decrease 
earnings to avoid tax payment by using DBTA. Mean and median values of DBOA are 0.005 and 0.000, respectively. 
This result implies that the listed firms manage earnings upward to mask their tax avoidance by using DBOA. EC, 
which represents management of two types of accruals at the same time, has a mean value of 0.295. This result 
implies that 29.5% of the sample firms simultaneously use DBTA to decrease taxable income and manage DBOA to 
increase book income. For control variables, the mean (median) for firm size (SIZE) is 26.223 (25.967), and the 
mean (median) for debt-equity ratio (LEV) is 0.462 (0.463). The mean (median) for cash flow from operations (CFO) 
is 0.053 (0.054). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables (N = 4,331) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
DBTA −0.004 0.140 −0.542 0.001 0.459 
DBOA 0.005 0.073 −0.236 0.000 0.359 
CAR 0.003 1.102 −2.843 −0.064 3.361 
UE 0.009 0.171 −2.206 0.004 2.826 
EC 0.295 0.456 0 0 1 
SIZE 26.223 1.433 23.686 25.967 30.708 
LEV 0.462 0.196 0.090 0.463 0.954 
CFO 0.053 0.084 −0.220 0.054 0.273 
PBR 0.884 0.877 0.011 0.613 5.165 
Notes: DBTA is discretionary book−tax accruals and DBOA is discretionary book-only accruals. CAR is the cumulative sum of the monthly 
abnormal return from April to March of the following year calculated using the market adjustment model. Here, the abnormal return is obtained 
by subtracting the monthly market return, calculated using the value-weighted market index (VWI) from the monthly stock return. UE is obtained 
by subtracting the actual net income of the previous year from the actual net income of the current year and dividing it by the initial total market 
value. EC is dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports negative discretionary book-tax accruals and positive discretionary book-only 
accruals at the same time and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. LEV is total liabilities scaled 
by total assets. CFO is cash flow from operations divided by total assets. PBR is the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
 
Table 3 presents the correlations among the variables used in the regression analysis. There is a negative 
association between DBTA and DBOA, which provides some evidence that earnings management with DBOA 
increases when financial income is reduced by DBTA. There is a positive relationship between cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) and UE, in accordance with the results of previous research. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients among Variables 
 DBOA CAR UE EC SIZE LEV CFO PBR 
DBTA −0.391*** 0.061*** −0.013 −0.493*** 0.072*** −0.124*** 0.029* −0.074*** 
DBOA  −0.020 0.165*** 0.459*** −0.036* 0.073*** −0.040*** 0.079*** 
CAR    0.118*** −0.017 −0.006 0.031 −0.026* 0.050*** 
UE    0.008 −0.025* 0.010 0.048*** 0.066*** 
EC      −0.030** 0.076*** −0.010 0.018 
SIZE      0.152*** 0.157*** 0.127*** 
LEV       −0.168*** 0.168*** 
CFO        0.006 
All variables are defined in Table 2. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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4.2 Regression Results 
 
Table 4 shows the empirical results for the association between DBOA and DBTA. If the sign of coefficient 
β1 is negative, Hypothesis 1 is supported. The coefficient for DBTA is –0.237 (t-value = −33.2), which is negative 
and significant at the 1% significance level. 
 
Managers have incentives to report higher than “true” book income and lower than “true” taxable income. 
Since higher revenues and lower expenses increase both financial profits and income tax liabilities, a trade-off exists 
between tax planning and financial reporting objectives. For example, companies that attempt to reduce their tax 
liabilities by either reducing income accruals or increasing expense accruals will also report lower financial earnings. 
Reducing book-tax accruals reduces financial statement net income, which can affect accounting-based contracts 
and reduce firm value. To offset these potential costs, managers may try to increase book income by using book-only 
accruals when attempting to decrease taxable income. This result implies that firms with DBTA earnings 
management have a tendency to inflate earnings upward using DBOA. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 
Table 4: Association between Discretionary Book−tax Accruals and Discretionary Book-only Accruals 
                                                    
                                                                                         
Variables Expected Sign Dependent Variable: DBOA 
  Coefficient t Value 
Intercept  −0.008 −0.41 
DBTA － −0.237 −33.2*** 
SIZE ＋/－ 0.000 0.17 
LEV ＋/－ −0.007 −1.45 
CFO － −0.034 −2.79*** 
PBR ＋ 0.006 5.39*** 
Industry dummy N/A Included  
Year dummy N/A Included  
F-Value 60.11***   
Adjusted    0.2309   
N 4,331   
All variables are defined in Table 2. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Table 5 shows the empirical results for the effects of earnings management on earnings response 
coefficients. Here, the key variable is EC, a dummy variable for firms with simultaneous negative DBTA and 
positive DBOA. The coefficient for EC*UE is –0.365 (t-value = −1.79), which is negative and significant at the 10% 
significance level. This result implies that investors in the market react negatively to firms managing book-tax and 
book-only accruals in two different ways at the same time. In other words, the stock market is fully aware of the 
management of accrual components and their reflection in current stock prices even when DBTA and DBOA offset 
each other. 
 
Table 5: Two Types of Discretionary Accruals: Response of the Capital Market 
                                                                                           
     
Variables Expected Sign Dependent Variable: DBOA 
  Coefficient t Value 
Intercept  0.049 0.18 
UE ＋ 1.091 9.31*** 
EC － −0.045 −1.27 
UE × EC － −0.365 −1.79* 
SIZE ＋/－ −0.005 −0.65 
LEV ＋/－ 0.078 0.92 
CFO － −0.511 −2.55** 
PBR ＋ 0.061 3.25*** 
Industry dummy N/A Included 
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Table 5 cont. 
Year dummy N/A Included 
F-Value 5.44*** 
Adjusted    0.02 
N 4,331 
All variables are defined in Table 2. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The higher book-tax conformity in Korea allows firms to manage earnings in two different ways 
simultaneously. Accruals with relatively high tax conformity are used to achieve tax planning goals, and accruals 
with relatively low tax conformity are used to accomplish financial reporting objectives. This study examines the 
effect of book-tax conformity in Korea on the use of accruals. For this purpose, we use a sample of 4,331 Korean 
firms, dividing total accruals into book-tax accruals and book-only accruals. In addition, we examine how the stock 
market interprets managers’ accounting decisions that affect discretionary accruals and taxes. 
 
Managers want to increase disclosed book income and reduce taxes, which are unilaterally paid with no 
benefit in return. Although previous studies have focused on earnings management or reduction of tax expenses, few 
have considered both simultaneously. The incentives for book income disclosure and taxes reduction are not 
independent; therefore, they must be considered together. In this study, these incentives are examined at the same 
time. 
 
If managers report higher book income in order to increase corporate value in the capital market, the 
income tax will increase, and if managers report lower book income to reduce income tax, stockholders will respond 
unfavorably. To managers facing this conflict between book income and taxable income, the best reporting strategy 
is to report higher book income and lower taxable income. Accordingly, managers may attempt to adjust 
discretionary accruals with consideration of the influence of their accounting choices regarding taxable income 
rather than simply attempting to adjust discretionary accruals. Therefore, we test accruals adjustment according to 
incentive, examining how companies use book-tax accruals and book-only accruals differently depending on the 
circumstances. The market response to accruals adjustment is also investigated. 
 
The research results are as follows. First, managers use book-tax accruals to lower taxable income and 
book-only accruals to increase book income. This result confirmed that managers utilize these two kinds of accruals 
differently. Second, reducing book-tax accruals reduces operating income as reported in the financial statement, 
which can affect accounting-based contracts and reduce firm value. To offset these potential costs, managers may try 
to increase book income by using book-only accruals to decrease taxable income. 
 
There are many types of earnings management. Discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model 
are insufficient to identify certain types of earnings management. For example, when book-tax accruals are used to 
reduce taxable income and book-only accruals are used to increase earnings at the same time, these two effects may 
offset each other. In this case, using the discretionary accruals method based on the Jones model is inadequate to 
measure earnings management. Use of this method may cause errors in the interpretation of regression results. This 
study confirmed that the informativeness of book income decreases when these two types of accruals are used in 
opposite directions. 
 
Following Calegari (2000), this study divided discretionary accruals, which are commonly used in previous 
studies as a measure of earnings management, into book-tax accruals and book-only accruals. We empirically 
demonstrated how these two types of accruals are used differently for earnings management based on book- and tax-
related incentives. In addition, earnings management is used to reduce taxes and increase reported earnings 
simultaneously. This study contributes to the literature in this area by shedding light on the market response to the 
differential use of these types of accruals. 
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